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We study a stochastic game where one player tries to find a
strategy such that the state process reaches a target of controlled-
loss-type, no matter which action is chosen by the other player. We
provide, in a general setup, a relaxed geometric dynamic program-
ming principle for this problem and derive, for the case of a controlled
SDE, the corresponding dynamic programming equation in the sense
of viscosity solutions. As an example, we consider a problem of partial
hedging under Knightian uncertainty.
1. Introduction. We study a stochastic (semi) game of the following
form. Given an initial condition (t, z) in time and space, we try to find
a strategy u[·] such that the controlled state process Z
u[ν],ν
t,z (·) reaches a cer-
tain target at the given time T , no matter which control ν is chosen by the
adverse player. The target is specified in terms of expected loss; that is, we
are given a real-valued (“loss”) function ℓ and try to keep the expected loss
above a given threshold p ∈R,
ess inf
ν
E[ℓ(Z
u[ν],ν
t,z (T ))|Ft]≥ p a.s.(1.1)
Instead of a game, one may also see this as a target problem under Knightian
uncertainty; then the adverse player has the role of choosing a worst-case
scenario.
Our aim is to describe, for given t, the set Λ(t) of all pairs (z, p) such
that there exists a strategy u attaining the target. We provide, in a general
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abstract framework, a geometric dynamic programming principle (GDP) for
this set. To this end, p is seen as an additional state variable and formulated
dynamically via a family {Mν} of auxiliary martingales with expectation
p, indexed by the adverse controls ν. Heuristically, the GDP then takes the
following form: Λ(t) consists of all (z, p) such that there exist a strategy u
and a family {Mν} satisfying
(Z
u[ν],ν
t,z (τ),M
ν(τ)) ∈ Λ(τ) a.s.
for all adverse controls ν and all stopping times τ ≥ t. The precise version
of the GDP, stated in Theorem 2.1, incorporates several relaxations that
allow us to deal with various technical problems. In particular, the selection
of ε-optimal strategies is solved by a covering argument which is possible
due to a continuity assumption on ℓ and a relaxation in the variable p. The
martingale Mν is constructed from the semimartingale decomposition of the
adverse player’s value process.
Our GDP is tailored such that the dynamic programming equation can be
derived in the viscosity sense. We exemplify this in Theorem 3.4 for the stan-
dard setup where the state process is determined by a stochastic differential
equation (SDE) with coefficients controlled by the two players; however, the
general GDP applies also in other situations such as singular control. The
solution of the equation, a partial differential equation (PDE) in our exam-
ple, corresponds to the indicator function of (the complement of) the graph
of Λ. In Theorem 3.8, we specialize to a case with a monotonicity condition,
that is, particularly suitable for pricing problems in mathematical finance.
Finally, in order to illustrate various points made throughout the paper,
we consider a concrete example of pricing an option with partial hedging,
according to a loss constraint, in a model where the drift and volatility
coefficients of the underlying are uncertain. In a worst-case analysis, the
uncertainty corresponds to an adverse player choosing the coefficients; a
formula for the corresponding seller’s price is given in Theorem 4.1.
Stochastic target (control) problems with almost-sure constraints, cor-
responding to the case where ℓ is an indicator function and ν is absent,
were introduced in [24, 25] as an extension of the classical superhedging
problem [9] in mathematical finance. Stochastic target problems with con-
trolled loss were first studied in [3] and are inspired by the quantile hedg-
ing problem [13]. The present paper is the first to consider stochastic tar-
get games. The rigorous treatment of zero-sum stochastic differential games
was pioneered in [12], where the mentioned selection problem for ε-optimal
strategies was treated by a discretization and a passage to continuous-time
limit in the PDEs. Let us remark, however, that we have not been able to
achieve satisfactory results for our problem using such techniques. We have
been importantly influenced by [7], where the value functions are defined in
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terms of essential infima and suprema, and then shown to be deterministic.
The formulation with an essential infimum (rather than an infimum of suit-
able expectations) in (1.1) is crucial in our case, mainly because {Mν} is
constructed by a method of non-Markovian control, which raises the fairly
delicate problem of dealing with one nullset for every adverse control ν.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains
the abstract setup and GDP. In Section 3 we specialize to the case of a
controlled SDE and derive the corresponding PDE, first in the general case
and then in the monotone case. The problem of hedging under uncertainty
is discussed in Section 4.
2. Geometric dynamic programming principle. In this section, we ob-
tain our geometric dynamic programming principle (GDP) in an abstract
framework. Some of our assumptions are simply the conditions we need in
the proof of the theorem; we will illustrate later how to actually verify them
in a typical setup.
2.1. Problem statement. We fix a time horizon T > 0 and a probability
space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a filtration F= (Ft)t∈[0,T ] satisfying the usual
conditions of right-continuity and completeness. We shall consider two sets
U and V of controls; for the sake of concreteness, we assume that each of
these sets consists of stochastic processes on (Ω,F), indexed by [0, T ] and
with values in some sets U and V , respectively. Moreover, let U be a set of
mappings u :V → U . Each u ∈ U is called a strategy, and the notation u[ν]
will be used for the control it associates with ν ∈ V . In applications, U will
be chosen to consist of mappings that are nonanticipating; see Section 3 for
an example. Furthermore, we are given a metric space (Z, dZ) and, for each
(t, z) ∈ [0, T ] × Z and (u, ν) ∈ U × V , an adapted ca`dla`g process Z
u[ν],ν
t,z (·)
with values in Z satisfying Z
u[ν],ν
t,z (t) = z. For brevity, we set
Zu,νt,z := Z
u[ν],ν
t,z .
Let ℓ :Z →R be a Borel-measurable function satisfying
E[|ℓ(Zu,νt,z (T ))|]<∞ for all (t, z,u, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×Z × U×V.(2.1)
We interpret ℓ as a loss (or “utility”) function and denote by
I(t, z,u, ν) := E[ℓ(Zu,νt,z (T ))|Ft] (t, z,u, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×Z ×U×V
the expected loss given ν (for the player choosing u) and by
J(t, z,u) := ess inf
ν∈V
I(t, z,u, ν) (t, z,u) ∈ [0, T ]×Z ×U
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the worst-case expected loss. The main object of this paper is the reachability
set
Λ(t) := {(z, p) ∈ Z ×R : there exists u ∈ U
(2.2)
such that J(t, z,u)≥ p P-a.s.}.
These are the initial conditions (z, p) such that starting at time t, the player
choosing u can attain an expected loss not worse than p, regardless of the
adverse player’s action ν. The main aim of this paper is to provide a geomet-
ric dynamic programming principle for Λ(t). For the case without adverse
player, a corresponding result was obtained in [24] for the target problem
with almost-sure constraints and in [3] for the problem with controlled loss.
As mentioned above, the dynamic programming for problem (2.2) requires
the introduction of a suitable set of martingales starting from p ∈ R. This
role will be played by certain families4 {Mν , ν ∈ V} of martingales which
should be considered as additional controls. More precisely, we denote by
Mt,p the set of all real-valued (right-continuous) martingales M satisfying
M(t) = p P-a.s., and we fix a set Mt,p of families {M
ν , ν ∈ V} ⊂Mt,p; fur-
ther assumptions on Mt,p will be introduced below. Since these martingales
are not present in the original problem (2.2), we can choose Mt,p at our
convenience; see also Remark 2.2 below.
As usual in optimal control, we shall need to concatenate controls and
strategies in time according to certain events. We use the notation
ν ⊕τ ν¯ := ν1[0,τ ] + ν¯1(τ,T ]
for the concatenation of two controls ν, ν¯ ∈ V at a stopping time τ . We also
introduce the set
{ν =(t,τ ] ν¯} := {ω ∈Ω:νs(ω) = ν¯s(ω) for all s ∈ (t, τ(ω)]}.
Analogous notation is used for elements of U .
In contrast to the setting of control, strategies can be concatenated only
at particular events and stopping times, as otherwise the resulting strategies
would fail to be elements of U (in particular, because they may fail to be
nonanticipating, see also Section 3). Therefore, we need to formalize the
events and stopping times which are admissible for this purpose: for each
t ≤ T , we consider a set Ft whose elements are families {A
ν , ν ∈ V} ⊂ Ft
of events indexed by V , as well as a set Tt whose elements are families
{τν , ν ∈ V} ⊂ Tt, where Tt denotes the set of all stopping times with values
in [t, T ]. We assume that Tt contains any deterministic time s ∈ [t, T ] (seen
as a constant family τν ≡ s, ν ∈ V). In practice, the sets Ft and Tt will
4Of course, there is no mathematical difference between families indexed by V , like
{Mν , ν ∈ V}, and mappings on V , like u. We shall use both notions interchangeably,
depending on notational convenience.
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not contain all families of events and stopping times, respectively; one will
impose additional conditions on ν 7→ Aν and ν 7→ τν that are compatible
with the conditions defining U. Both sets should be seen as auxiliary objects
which make it easier (if not possible) to verify the dynamic programming
conditions below.
2.2. The geometric dynamic programming principle. We can now state
the conditions for our main result. The first one concerns the concatenation
of controls and strategies.
Assumption (C). The following hold for all t ∈ [0, T ]:
(C1) Fix ν0, ν1, ν2 ∈ V and A ∈ Ft. Then ν := ν0 ⊕t (ν11A + ν21Ac) ∈ V .
(C2) Fix (uj)j≥0 ⊂ U, and let {A
ν
j , ν ∈ V}j≥1 ⊂ Ft be such that {A
ν
j , j ≥
1} forms a partition of Ω for each ν ∈ V . Then u∈ U for
u[ν] := u0[ν]⊕t
∑
j≥1
uj [ν]1Aνj , ν ∈ V.
(C3) Let u ∈ U and ν ∈ V . Then u[ν ⊕t ·] ∈ U.
(C4) Let {Aν , ν ∈ V} ⊂ Ft be a family of events such that A
ν1 ∩{ν1 =(0,t]
ν2}=A
ν2 ∩ {ν1 =(0,t] ν2} for all ν1, ν2 ∈ V . Then {A
ν , ν ∈ V} ∈ Ft.
(C5) Let {τν , ν ∈ V} ∈ Tt. Then {τ
ν1 ≤ s} ∩ {ν1 =(0,s] ν2} = {τ
ν2 ≤ s} ∩
{ν1 =(0,s] ν2} P-a.s. for all ν1, ν2 ∈ V and s ∈ [t, T ].
(C6) Let {τν , ν ∈ V} ∈ Tt. Then, for all t≤ s1 ≤ s2 ≤ T , {{τ
ν ∈ (s1, s2]}, ν ∈
V} and {{τν /∈ (s1, s2]}, ν ∈ V} belong to Fs2 .
The second condition concerns the behavior of the state process.
Assumption (Z). The following hold for all (t, z, p) ∈ [0, T ]×Z×R and
s ∈ [t, T ]:
(Z1) Zu1,νt,z (s)(ω) = Z
u2,ν
t,z (s)(ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈ {u1[ν] =(t,s] u2[ν]}, for all
ν ∈ V and u1,u2 ∈ U.
(Z2) Zu,ν1t,z (s)(ω) = Z
u,ν2
t,z (s)(ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈ {ν1 =(0,s] ν2}, for all u ∈ U
and ν1, ν2 ∈ V .
(Z3) Mν1(s)(ω) =Mν2(s)(ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈ {ν1 =(0,s] ν2}, for all {M
ν , ν ∈
V} ∈Mt,p and ν1, ν2 ∈ V .
(Z4) There exists a constant K(t, z) ∈R such that
ess sup
u∈U
ess inf
ν∈V
E[ℓ(Zu,νt,z (T ))|Ft] =K(t, z) P-a.s.
The nontrivial assumption here is, of course, (Z4), stating that (a version
of) the random variable ess supu∈U ess infν∈V E[ℓ(Z
u,ν
t,z (T ))|Ft] is determinis-
tic. For the game determined by a Brownian SDE as considered in Section 3,
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this will be true by a result of [7], which, in turn, goes back to an idea of
[21] (see also [16]). An extension to jump diffusions can be found in [6].
While the above assumptions are fundamental, the following conditions
are of technical nature. We shall illustrate later how they can be verified.
Assumption (I). Let (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]×Z , u ∈ U and ν ∈ V .
(I1) There exists an adapted right-continuous process Nu,νt,z of class (D)
such that
ess inf
ν¯∈V
E[ℓ(Zu,ν⊕sν¯t,z (T ))|Fs]≥N
u,ν
t,z (s) P-a.s. for all s ∈ [t, T ].
(I2) There exists an adapted right-continuous process Lu,νt,z such that
Lu,νt,z (s) ∈L
1 and
ess inf
u¯∈U
E[ℓ(Zu⊕su¯,νt,z (T ))|Fs]≥ L
u,ν
t,z (s) P-a.s. for all s ∈ [t, T ].
Moreover, Lu,ν1t,z (s)(ω) =L
u,ν2
t,z (s)(ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈ {ν1 =(0,s] ν2}, for all u ∈ U
and ν1, ν2 ∈ V .
Assumption (R). Let (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]×Z .
(R1) Fix s ∈ [t, T ] and ε > 0. Then there exist a Borel-measurable parti-
tion (Bj)j≥1 of Z and a sequence (zj)j≥1 ⊂Z such that for all u∈ U, ν ∈ V
and j ≥ 1,
E[ℓ(Zu,νt,z (T ))|Fs]≥ I(s, zj,u, ν)− ε,
ess inf
ν¯∈V
E[ℓ(Zu,ν⊕sν¯t,z (T ))|Fs]≤ J(s, zj,u[ν ⊕s ·]) + ε,
K(s, zj)− ε≤K(s,Z
u,ν
t,z (s))≤K(s, zj) + ε


P-a.s. on {Zu,νt,z (s) ∈Bj}.
(R2) limδ→0 supν∈V ,τ∈Tt P{sup0≤h≤δ dZ(Z
u,ν
t,z (τ + h),Z
u,ν
t,z (τ))≥ ε}= 0 for
all u ∈ U and ε > 0.
Our GDP will be stated in terms of the closure
Λ¯(t) :=
{
(z, p) ∈Z ×R : there exist (tn, zn, pn)→ (t, z, p)
such that (zn, pn) ∈Λ(tn) and tn ≥ t for all n≥ 1
}
and the uniform interior
Λι(t) := {(z, p) ∈ Z ×R : (t
′, z′, p′) ∈Bι(t, z, p) implies (z
′, p′) ∈ Λ(t′)},
where Bι(t, z, p)⊂ [0, T ]×Z ×R denotes the open ball with center (t, z, p)
and radius ι > 0 [with respect to the distance function dZ(z, z
′) + |p− p′|+
|t− t′|]. The relaxation from Λ to Λ¯ and Λι essentially allows us to reduce to
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stopping times with countably many values in the proof of the GDP and thus
to avoid regularity assumptions in the time variable. We shall also relax the
variable p in the assertion of (GDP2); this is inspired by [4] and important
for the covering argument in the proof of (GDP2), which, in turn, is crucial
due to the lack of a measurable selection theorem for strategies. Of course,
all our relaxations are tailored such that they will not interfere substantially
with the derivation of the dynamic programming equation; cf. Section 3.
Theorem 2.1. Fix (t, z, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Z × R and let Assumptions (C),
(Z), (I) and (R) hold true.
(GDP1) If (z, p) ∈ Λ(t), then there exist u ∈ U and {Mν , ν ∈ V} ⊂Mt,p
such that
(Zu,νt,z (τ),M
ν(τ)) ∈ Λ¯(τ) P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V and τ ∈ Tt.
(GDP2) Let ι > 0, u ∈ U, {Mν , ν ∈ V} ∈Mt,p and {τ
ν , ν ∈ V} ∈ Tt be
such that
(Zu,νt,z (τ
ν),Mν(τν)) ∈ Λι(τ
ν) P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V
and suppose that {Mν(τν)+ :ν ∈ V} and {Lu,νt,z (τ
′)− :ν ∈ V, τ ′ ∈ Tt} are uni-
formly integrable, where Lu,νt,z is as in (I2). Then (z, p − ε) ∈ Λ(t) for all
ε > 0.
The proof is stated in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 below.
Remark 2.2. We shall see in the proof that the family {Mν , ν ∈ V} ⊂
Mt,p in (GDP1) can actually be chosen to be nonanticipating in the sense
of (Z3). However, this will not be used when (GDP1) is applied to derive
the dynamic programming equation. Whether {Mν , ν ∈ V} is an element of
Mt,p will depend on the definition of the latter set; in fact, we did not make
any assumption about its richness. In many application, it is possible to take
Mt,p to be the set of all nonanticipating families inMt,p; however, we prefer
to leave some freedom for the definition of Mt,p since this may be useful in
ensuring the uniform integrability required in (GDP2).
We conclude this section with a version of the GDP for the case Z =Rd,
where we show how to reduce from standard regularity conditions on the
state process and the loss function to the Assumptions (R1) and (I).
Corollary 2.3. Let Assumptions (C), (Z) and (R2) hold true. Assume
also that ℓ is continuous and that there exist constants C ≥ 0 and q¯ > q ≥ 0
and a locally bounded function ̺ :Rd 7→R+ such that
|ℓ(z)| ≤ C(1 + |z|q),(2.3)
ess sup
(u¯,ν¯)∈U×V
E[|Z u¯,ν¯t,z (T )|
q¯|Ft]≤ ̺(z)
q¯ P-a.s.(2.4)
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and
ess sup
(u¯,ν¯)∈U×V
E[|Zu⊕su¯,ν⊕sν¯t,z (T )−Z
u¯,ν⊕sν¯
s,z′ (T )||Fs]
(2.5)
≤C|Zu,νt,z (s)− z
′| P-a.s.
for all (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd, (s, z′) ∈ [t, T ]×Rd and (u, ν) ∈ U×V .
Let (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd, and let {τu,ν , (u, ν) ∈ U×V} ⊂ Tt be such that the
collection {Zu,νt,z (τ
u,ν), (u, ν) ∈ U×V} is uniformly bounded in L∞.
(GDP1′) If (z, p + ε) ∈ Λ(t) for some ε > 0, then there exist u ∈ U and
{Mν , ν ∈ V} ⊂Mt,p such that
(Zu,νt,z (τ
u,ν),Mν(τu,ν)) ∈ Λ¯(τu,ν) P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V .
(GDP2′) If ι > 0, u ∈ U and {Mν , ν ∈ V} ∈Mt,p are such that
(Zu,νt,z (τ
u,ν),Mν(τu,ν)) ∈ Λι(τ
u,ν) P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V
and {τu,ν , ν ∈ V} ∈ Tt, then (z, p− ε) ∈ Λ(t) for all ε > 0.
We remark that Corollary 2.3 is usually applied in a setting where τu,ν is
the exit time of Zu,νt,z from a given ball, so that the boundedness assumption
is not restrictive. (Some adjustments are needed when the state process
admits unbounded jumps; see also [18].)
2.3. Proof of (GDP1). We fix t ∈ [0, T ] and (z, p) ∈Λ(t) for the remain-
der of this proof. By definition (2.2) of Λ(t), there exists u ∈ U such that
E[G(ν)|Ft]≥ p P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V, where G(ν) := ℓ(Z
u,ν
t,z (T )).(2.6)
In order to construct the family {Mν , ν ∈ V} ⊂ Mt,p of martingales, we
consider
Sν(r) := ess inf
ν¯∈V
E[G(ν ⊕r ν¯)|Fr], t≤ r≤ T.(2.7)
We shall obtain Mν from a Doob–Meyer-type decomposition of Sν . This
can be seen as a generalization with respect to [3], where the necessary
martingale was trivially constructed by taking the conditional expectation
of the terminal reward.
Step 1. We have Sν(r) ∈ L1(P) and E[Sν(r)|Fs]≥ S
ν(s) for all t≤ s≤ r≤
T and ν ∈ V .
The integrability of Sν(r) follows from (2.1) and (I1). To see the sub-
martingale property, we first show that the family {E[G(ν ⊕r ν¯)|Fr], ν¯ ∈ V}
is directed downward. Indeed, given ν¯1, ν¯2 ∈ V , the set
A := {E[G(ν ⊕r ν¯1)|Fr]≤ E[G(ν ⊕r ν¯2)|Fr]}
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is in Fr; therefore, ν¯3 := ν⊕r (ν¯11A+ ν¯21Ac) is an element of V by Assump-
tion (C1). Hence, (Z2) yields that
E[G(ν ⊕r ν¯3)|Fr] = E[G(ν ⊕r ν¯1)1A +G(ν ⊕r ν¯2)1Ac |Fr]
= E[G(ν ⊕r ν¯1)|Fr]1A +E[G(ν ⊕r ν¯2)|Fr]1Ac
= E[G(ν ⊕r ν¯1)|Fr]∧E[G(ν ⊕r ν¯2)|Fr].
As a result, we can find a sequence (ν¯n)n≥1 in V such that E[G(ν⊕r ν¯n)|Fr]
decreases P-a.s. to Sν(r); cf. [19], Proposition VI-1-1. Recalling (2.1) and
that Sν(r) ∈ L1(P), monotone convergence yields that
E[Sν(r)|Fs] = E
[
lim
n→∞
E[G(ν ⊕r ν¯n)|Fr]|Fs
]
= lim
n→∞
E[G(ν ⊕r ν¯n)|Fs]
≥ ess inf
ν¯∈V
E[G(ν ⊕r ν¯)|Fs]
≥ ess inf
ν¯∈V
E[G(ν ⊕s ν¯)|Fs]
= Sν(s),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that any control ν⊕r ν¯, where
ν¯ ∈ V , can be written in the form ν ⊕s (ν ⊕r ν¯); cf. (C1).
Step 2. There exists a family of ca`dla`g martingales {Mν , ν ∈ V} ⊂Mt,p
such that Sν(r)≥Mν(r) P-a.s. for all r ∈ [t, T ] and ν ∈ V .
Fix ν ∈ V . By step 1, Sν(·) satisfies the submartingale property. Therefore,
S+(r)(ω) := lim
u∈(r,T ]∩Q,u→r
Sν(u)(ω) for 0≤ r < T and S+(T ) := S
ν(T )
is well defined P-a.s.; moreover, recalling that the filtration F satisfies the
usual conditions, S+ is a (right-continuous) submartingale satisfying S+(r)≥
Sν(r) P-a.s. for all r ∈ [t, T ]; cf. [8], Theorem VI.2. Let H ⊂ [t, T ] be the set
of points where the function r 7→ E[Sν(r)] is not right-continuous. Since
this function is increasing, H is at most countable. (If H happens to be
the empty set, then S+ defines a modification of S
ν and the Doob–Meyer
decomposition of S+ yields the result.) Consider the process
S¯(r) := S+(r)1Hc(r) + S
ν(r)1H(r), r ∈ [t, T ].
The arguments (due to Lenglart) in the proof of [8], Theorem 10 of Ap-
pendix 1, show that S¯ is an optional modification of Sν and E[S¯(τ)|Fσ ]≥
S¯(σ) for all σ, τ ∈ Tt such that σ ≤ τ ; that is, S¯ is a strong submartingale.
Let N = Nu,νt,z be a right-continuous process of class (D) as in (I1); then
Sν(r)≥N(r) P-a.s. for all r implies that S+(r)≥N(r) P-a.s. for all r, and
since both S+ and N are right-continuous, this shows that S+ ≥N up to
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evanescence. Recalling that H is countable, we deduce that S¯ ≥ N up to
evanescence, and as S¯ is bounded from above by the martingale generated
by S¯(T ), we conclude that S¯ is of class (D).
Now the decomposition result of Mertens [17], Theorem 3, yields that
there exist a (true) martingale M¯ and a nondecreasing (not necessarily
ca`dla`g) predictable process C¯ with C¯(t) = 0 such that
S¯ = M¯ + C¯
and in view of the usual conditions, M¯ can be chosen to be ca`dla`g. We can
now define Mν := M¯ − M¯(t) + p on [t, T ] and Mν(r) := p for r ∈ [0, t), then
Mν ∈Mt,p. Noting that M¯(t) = S¯(t) = S
ν(t)≥ p by (2.6), we see that Mν
has the required property
Mν(r)≤ M¯(r)≤ S¯(r) = Sν(r) P-a.s. for all r ∈ [t, T ].
Step 3. Let τ ∈ Tt have countably many values. Then
K(τ,Zu,νt,z (τ))≥M
ν(τ) P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V.
Fix ν ∈ V and ε > 0, let Mν be as in step 2 and let (ti)i≥1 be the distinct
values of τ . By step 2, we have
Mν(ti)≤ ess inf
ν¯∈V
E[ℓ(Z
u,ν⊕ti ν¯
t,z (T ))|Fti ] P-a.s., i≥ 1.
Moreover, (R1) yields that for each i≥ 1, we can find a sequence (zij)j≥1 ⊂Z
and a Borel partition (Bij)j≥1 of Z such that
ess inf
ν¯∈V
E[ℓ(Z
u,ν⊕ti ν¯
t,z (T ))|Fti ](ω)≤ J(ti, zij ,u[ν ⊕ti ·])(ω) + ε
for P-a.e. ω ∈Cij := {Z
u,ν
t,z (ti) ∈Bij}.
Since (C3) and the definition of K in (Z4) yield that J(ti, zij,u[ν ⊕ti ·]) ≤
K(ti, zij), we conclude by (R1) that
Mν(ti)(ω)≤K(ti, zij) + ε≤K(ti,Z
u,ν
t,z (ti)(ω)) + 2ε for P-a.e. ω ∈Cij .
Let Ai := {τ = ti} ∈ Fτ . Then (Ai ∩Cij)i,j≥1 forms a partition of Ω, and the
above shows that
Mν(τ)− 2ε≤
∑
i,j≥1
K(ti,Z
u,ν
t,z (ti))1Ai∩Cij =K(τ,Z
u,ν
t,z (τ)) P-a.s.
As ε > 0 was arbitrary, the claim follows.
Step 4. We can now prove (GDP1). Given τ ∈ Tt, pick a sequence (τn)n≥1 ⊂
Tt such that each τn has countably many values and τn ↓ τ P-a.s. In view of
the last statement of Lemma 2.4 below, step 3 implies that
(Zu,νt,z (τn),M
ν(τn)− n
−1) ∈ Λ(τn) P-a.s. for all n≥ 1
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However, using that Zu,νt,z and M
ν are ca`dla`g, we have
(τn,Z
u,ν
t,z (τn),M
ν(τn)− n
−1)→ (τ,Zu,νt,z (τ),M
ν(τ)) P-a.s. as n→∞,
so that, by the definition of Λ¯, we deduce that (Zu,νt,z (τ),M
ν(τ)) ∈ Λ¯(τ) P-a.s.
Lemma 2.4. Let Assumptions (C2), (C4), (Z1) and (Z4) hold true. For
each ε > 0, there exists a mapping µε : [0, T ]×Z → U such that
J(t, z, µε(t, z))≥K(t, z)− ε P-a.s. for all (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]×Z.
In particular, if (t, z, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Z × R, then K(t, z) > p implies (z, p) ∈
Λ(t).
Proof. Since K(t, z) was defined in (Z4) as the essential supremum of
J(t, z,u) over u, there exists a sequence (uk(t, z))k≥1 ⊂ U such that
sup
k≥1
J(t, z,uk(t, z)) =K(t, z) P-a.s.(2.8)
Set ∆0t,z :=∅ and define inductively the Ft-measurable sets
∆kt,z := {J(t, z,u
k(t, z))≥K(t, z)− ε}
∖ k−1⋃
j=0
∆jt,z, k ≥ 1.
By (2.8), the family {∆kt,z, k ≥ 1} forms a partition of Ω. Clearly, each ∆
k
t,z
(seen as a constant family) satisfies the requirement of (C4) since it does
not depend on ν and therefore belongs to Ft. Hence after fixing some u0 ∈ U,
(C2) implies that
µε(t, z) := u0 ⊕t
∑
k≥1
uk(t, z)1∆kt,z
∈ U,
while (Z1) ensures that
J(t, z, µε(t, z)) = ess inf
ν∈V
E[ℓ(Z
µε(t,z),ν
t,z (T ))|Ft]
= ess inf
ν∈V
E
[∑
k≥1
ℓ(Z
uk(t,z),ν
t,z (T ))1∆kt,z
|Ft
]
= ess inf
ν∈V
∑
k≥1
E[ℓ(Z
uk(t,z),ν
t,z (T ))|Ft]1∆kt,z ,
where the last step used that ∆kt,z is Ft-measurable. Since
E[ℓ(Z
uk(t,z),ν
t,z (T ))|Ft]≥ J(t, z,u
k(t, z))
12 B. BOUCHARD, L. MOREAU AND M. NUTZ
by the definition of J , it follows by the definition of {∆kt,z, k ≥ 1} that
J(t, z, µε(t, z))≥
∑
k≥1
J(t, z,uk(t, z))1∆kt,z
≥K(t, z)− ε P-a.s.
as required. 
Remark 2.5. Let us mention that the GDP could also be formulated us-
ing families of submartingales {Sν , ν ∈ V} rather than martingales. Namely,
in (GDP1), these would be the processes defined by (2.7). However, such
a formulation would not be advantageous for applications as in Section 3
because we would then need an additional control process to describe the
(possibly very irregular) finite variation part of Sν . The fact that the mar-
tingales {Mν , ν ∈ V} are actually sufficient to obtain a useful GDP can be
explained heuristically as follows: the relevant situation for the dynamic
programming equation corresponds to the adverse player choosing an (al-
most) optimal control ν, and then the value process Sν will be (almost) a
martingale.
2.4. Proof of (GDP2). In the sequel, we fix (t, z, p) ∈ [0, T ]×Z ×R and
let ι > 0, u ∈ U, {Mν , ν ∈ V} ∈Mt,p, {τ
ν , ν ∈ V} ∈ Tt and L
u,ν
t,z be as in
(GDP2). We shall use the dyadic discretization for the stopping times τν ;
that is, given n≥ 1, we set
τνn =
∑
0≤i≤2n−1
tni+11(tni ,tni+1](τ
ν) where tni = i2
−nT for 0≤ i≤ 2n.
We shall first state the proof under the additional assumption that
Mν(·) =Mν(· ∧ τν) for all ν ∈ V.(2.9)
Step 1. Fix ε > 0 and n≥ 1. There exists uεn ∈ U such that
E[ℓ(Z
uεn,ν
t,z (T ))|Fτνn ]≥K(τ
ν
n ,Z
u,ν
t,z (τ
ν
n ))− ε P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V.
We fix ε > 0 and n≥ 1. It follows from (R1) and (C2) that, for each i≤ 2n,
we can find a Borel partition (Bij)j≥1 of Z and a sequence (zij)j≥1 ⊂Z such
that, for all u¯ ∈ U and ν ∈ V ,
E[ℓ(Z
u⊕tn
i
u¯,ν
t,z (T ))|Ftni ](ω)≥ I(t
n
i , zij,u⊕tni u¯, ν)(ω)− ε(2.10)
and
K(tni , zij)≥K(t
n
i ,Z
u,ν
t,z (t
n
i )(ω))− ε
(2.11)
for P-a.e. ω ∈Cνij := {Z
u,ν
t,z (t
n
i ) ∈Bij}.
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Let µε be as in Lemma 2.4, uεij := µ
ε(tni , zij) and A
ν
ij :=C
ν
ij ∩{τ
ν
n = t
n
i }, and
consider the mapping
ν 7→ uεn[ν] := u[ν]⊕τνn
∑
j≥1,i≤2n
uεij[ν]1Aνij .
Note that (Z2) and (C4) imply that {Cνij , ν ∈ V}j≥1 ⊂ Ftni for each i≤ 2
n.
Similarly, it follows from (C6) and the definition of τνn that the families
{{τνn = t
n
i }, ν ∈ V} and {{τ
ν
n = t
n
i }
c, ν ∈ V} belong to Ftni . Therefore, an
induction (over i) based on (C2) yields that uεn ∈ U. Using successively (2.10),
(Z1), the definition of J , Lemma 2.4 and (2.11), we deduce that for P-a.e.
ω ∈Aνij ,
E[ℓ(Z
uεn,ν
t,z (T ))|Fτνn ](ω)≥ I(t
n
i , zij ,u
ε
ij, ν)(ω)− ε
≥ J(tni , zij , µ
ε(tni , zij))(ω)− ε
≥K(tni , zij)− 2ε
≥K(tni ,Z
u,ν
t,z (t
n
i )(ω))− 3ε
=K(τνn(ω),Z
u,ν
t,z (τ
ν
n)(ω))− 3ε.
As ε > 0 was arbitrary and
⋃
i,j A
ν
ij =Ω P-a.s., this proves the claim.
Step 2. Fix ε > 0 and n≥ 1. For all ν ∈ V , we have
E[ℓ(Z
uεn,ν
t,z (T ))|Fτνn ](ω)≥M
ν(τνn)(ω)− ε for P-a.e. ω ∈E
ν
n,
where
Eνn := {(τ
ν
n ,Z
u,ν
t,z (τ
ν
n ),M
ν(τνn)) ∈Bι(τ
ν ,Zu,νt,z (τ
ν),Mν(τν))}.
Indeed, since (Zu,νt,z (τ
ν),Mν(τν)) ∈ Λι(τ
ν) P-a.s., the definition of Λι en-
tails that (Zu,νt,z (τ
ν
n),M
ν(τνn)) ∈Λ(τ
ν
n ) for P-a.e. ω ∈E
ν
n. This, in turn, means
that
K(τνn(ω),Z
u,ν
t,z (τ
ν
n)(ω))≥M
ν(τνn)(ω) for P-a.e. ω ∈E
ν
n.
Now the claim follows from step 1. [In all this, we actually have Mν(τνn) =
Mν(τν) by (2.9), a fact we do not use here.]
Step 3. Let Lν := Lu,νt,z be the process from (I2). Then
K(t, z)≥ p− ε− sup
ν∈V
E[(Lν(τνn)−M
ν(τνn))
−
1(Eνn)
c ].
Indeed, it follows from step 2 and (I2) that
E[ℓ(Z
uεn,ν
t,z (T ))|Ft]
≥ E[Mν(τνn )1Eνn |Ft]− ε+ E[E[ℓ(Z
uεn,ν
t,z (T ))|Fτνn ]1(Eνn)c |Ft]
≥ E[Mν(τνn )|Ft]−E[M
ν(τνn)1(Eνn)c |Ft]− ε+E[L
ν(τνn )1(Eνn)c |Ft]
= p− ε+E[(Lν(τνn)−M
ν(τνn))1(Eνn)c |Ft].
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By the definitions of K and J , we deduce that
K(t, z)≥ J(t, z,uεn)
≥ p− ε+ ess inf
ν∈V
E[(Lν(τνn)−M
ν(τνn))1(Eνn)c |Ft].
Since K is deterministic, we can take expectations on both sides to obtain
that
K(t, z)≥ p− ε+ E[ess inf
ν∈V
E[Y ν |Ft]],
where Y ν := (Lν(τνn)−M
ν(τνn ))1(Eνn)c .
The family {E[Y ν |Ft], ν ∈ V} is directed downward; to see this, use (C1),
(Z2), (Z3), (C5) and the last statement in (I2), and argue as in step 1 of the
proof of (GDP1) in Section 2.3. It then follows that we can find a sequence
(νk)k≥1 ⊂ V such that E[Y
νk |Ft] decreases P-a.s. to ess infν∈V E[Y
ν |Ft] (cf.
[19], Proposition VI-1-1) so that the claim follows by monotone convergence.
Step 4. We have
lim
n→∞
sup
ν∈V
E[(Lν(τνn)−M
ν(τνn))
−1(Eνn)c ] = 0 P-a.s.
Indeed, since Mν(τνn) =M
ν(τν) by (2.9), the uniform integrability as-
sumptions in Theorem 2.1 yield that {(Lν(τνn)−M
ν(τνn ))
− :n≥ 1, ν ∈ V} is
again uniformly integrable. Therefore, it suffices to prove that
supν∈V P{(E
ν
n)
c} → 0. To see this, note that for n large enough, we have
|τνn − τ
ν | ≤ 2−nT ≤ ι/2 and hence
P{(Eνn)
c} ≤ P{dZ(Z
u,ν
t,z (τ
ν
n),Z
u,ν
t,z (τ
ν))≥ ι/2},
where we have used thatMν(τνn) =M
ν(τν). Using once more that |τνn−τ
ν| ≤
2−nT , the claim then follows from (R2).
Step 5. The additional assumption (2.9) entails no loss of generality.
Indeed, let M˜ν be the stopped martingale Mν(· ∧ τν). Then {M˜ν , ν ∈
V} ⊂Mt,p. Moreover, since {M
ν , ν ∈ V} ∈Mt,p and {τ
ν , ν ∈ V} ∈ Tt, we see
from (Z3) and (C5) that {M˜ν , ν ∈ V} again satisfies the property stated in
(Z3). Finally, we have that the set {M˜ν(τν)+ :ν ∈ V} is uniformly integrable
like {Mν(τν)+ :ν ∈ V}, since these sets coincide. Hence, {M˜ν , ν ∈ V} satisfies
all properties required in (GDP2), and of course also (2.9). To be precise, it
is not necessarily the case that {M˜ν , ν ∈ V} ∈Mt,p; in fact, we have made no
assumption whatsoever about the richness of Mt,p. However, the previous
properties are all we have used in this proof and hence, we may indeed
replace Mν by M˜ν for the purpose of proving (GDP2).
We can now complete the proof of (GDP2): in view of step 4, step 3
yields that K(t, z)≥ p− ε, which by Lemma 2.4 implies the assertion that
(z, p− ε) ∈ Λ(t).
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2.5. Proof of Corollary 2.3. Step 1. Assume that ℓ is bounded and Lip-
schitz continuous. Then (I) and (R1) are satisfied.
Assumption (I) is trivially satisfied; we prove that (2.5) implies Assump-
tion (R1). Let t≤ s≤ T and (u, ν) ∈ U×V . Let c be the Lipschitz constant
of ℓ. By (2.5), we have
|E[ℓ(Zu,νt,z (T ))− ℓ(Z
u,ν
s,z′(T ))|Fs]| ≤ cE[|Z
u,ν
t,z (T )−Z
u,ν
s,z′(T )||Fs]
≤ cC|Zu,νt,z (s)− z
′|(2.12)
for all z, z′ ∈ Rd. Let (Bj)j≥1 be any Borel partition of R
d such that the
diameter of Bj is less than ε/(cC), and let zj ∈Bj for each j ≥ 1. Then
|E[ℓ(Zu,νt,z (T ))− ℓ(Z
u,ν
s,zj(T ))|Fs]| ≤ ε on C
u,ν
j := {Z
u,ν
t,z (s) ∈Bj},
which implies the first property in (R1). In particular, let ν¯ ∈ V , then using
(C1), we have
|E[ℓ(Zu,ν⊕sν¯t,z (T ))− ℓ(Z
u,ν⊕sν¯
s,zj (T ))|Fs]| ≤ ε on C
u,ν⊕sν¯
j .
Since Cu,ν⊕sν¯j =C
u,ν
j by (Z2), we may take the essential infimum over ν¯ ∈ V
to conclude that
ess inf
ν¯∈V
E[ℓ(Zu,ν⊕sν¯t,z (T ))|Fs]≤ J(s, zj,u[ν ⊕s ·]) + ε on C
u,ν
j ,
which is the second property in (R1). Finally, the last property in (R1) is a
direct consequence of (2.12) applied with t= s.
Step 2. We now prove the corollary under the additional assumption that
|ℓ(z)| ≤C; we shall reduce to the Lipschitz case by inf-convolution. Indeed,
if we define the functions ℓk by
ℓk(z) = inf
z′∈Rd
{ℓ(z′) + k|z′ − z|}, k ≥ 1
then ℓk is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant k, |ℓk| ≤ C, and
(ℓk)k≥1 converges pointwise to ℓ. Since ℓ is continuous and the sequence
(ℓk)k≥1 is monotone increasing, the convergence is uniform on compact sets
by Dini’s lemma. That is, for all n≥ 1,
sup
z∈Rd,|z|≤n
|ℓk(z)− ℓ(z)| ≤ ǫ
n
k ,(2.13)
where (ǫnk)k≥1 is a sequence of numbers such that limk→∞ ǫ
n
k = 0. Moreover,
(2.4) combined with Chebyshev’s inequality imply that
ess sup
(u,ν)∈U×V
P{|Zu,νt,z (T )| ≥ n|Ft} ≤ (̺(z)/n)
q¯.(2.14)
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Combining (2.13) and (2.14) and using the fact that ℓk − ℓ is bounded by
2C then leads to
ess sup
(u,ν)∈U×V
E[|ℓk(Z
u,ν
t,z (T ))− ℓ(Z
u,ν
t,z (T ))||Ft]≤ ǫ
n
k + 2C(̺(z)/n)
q¯.(2.15)
Let O be a bounded subset of Rd, let η > 0 and let
Ik(t, z,u, ν) = E[ℓk(Z
u,ν
t,z (T ))|Ft].(2.16)
Then we can choose an integer nηO such that 2C(̺(z)/n
η
O)
q¯ ≤ η/2 for all
z ∈O and another integer kηO such that ǫ
nη
O
kη
O
≤ η/2. Under these conditions,
(2.15) applied to n= nηO yields that
ess sup
(u,ν)∈U×V
|Ikη
O
(t, z,u, ν)− I(t, z,u, ν)| ≤ η for (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]×O.(2.17)
In the sequel, we fix (t, z, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd × R and a bounded set O ⊂ Rd
containing z, and define Jkη
O
, Λkη
O
, Λkη
O
,ι and Λ¯kη
O
in terms of ℓkη
O
instead
of ℓ.
We now prove (GDP1′). To this end, suppose that (z, p + 2η) ∈ Λ(t).
Then (2.17) implies that (z, p+ η) ∈Λkη
O
(t). In view of step 1, we may apply
(GDP1) with the loss function ℓkη
O
to obtain u ∈ U and {Mν , ν ∈ V} ⊂Mt,p
such that
(Zu,νt,z (τ),M
ν(τ) + η) ∈ Λ¯kη
O
(τ) P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V and τ ∈ Tt.
Using once more (2.17), we deduce that
(Zu,νt,z (τ),M
ν(τ)) ∈ Λ¯(τ)
P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V and τ ∈ Tt such that Z
u,ν
t,z (τ) ∈O.
Recalling that {Zu,νt,z (τ
u,ν), (u, ν) ∈ U×V} is uniformly bounded and enlarg-
ing O if necessary, we deduce that (GDP1′) holds for ℓ. [The last two ar-
guments are superfluous as ℓ≥ ℓkη
O
already implies Λ¯kη
O
(τ)⊂ Λ¯(τ); however,
we would like to refer to this proof in a similar situation below where there
is no monotonicity.]
It remains to prove (GDP2′). To this end, let ι > 0, u ∈ U, {Mν , ν ∈ V} ∈
Mt,p and {τ
ν , ν ∈ V} ∈ Tt be such that
(Zu,νt,z (τ
ν),Mν(τν)) ∈ Λ2ι(τ
ν) P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V.
For η < ι/2, we then have
(Zu,νt,z (τ
ν),Mν(τν) + 2η) ∈Λι(τ
ν) P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V.(2.18)
Let M˜ν :=Mν + η. Since {Zu,νt,z (τ
ν), ν ∈ V} is uniformly bounded in L∞, we
may assume, by enlarging O if necessary, that Bι(Z
u,ν
t,z (τ
ν)) ⊂ O P-a.s. for
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all ν ∈ V . Then (2.17) and (2.18) imply that
(Zu,νt,z (τ
ν), M˜ν(τν)) ∈ Λkη
O
,ι(τ
ν) P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V.
Moreover, as ℓ≤C, (2.18) implies that M˜ν(τν)≤C; in particular, {M˜ν(τν)+,
ν ∈ V} is uniformly integrable. Furthermore, as ℓ≥−C, we can take Lu,νt,z :=
−C for (I2). In view of step 1, (GDP2) applied with the loss function ℓkη
O
then yields that
(z, p+ η− ε) ∈Λkη
O
(t) for all ε > 0.(2.19)
To be precise, this conclusion would require that {M˜ν , ν ∈ V} ∈Mt,p+η ,
which is not necessarily the case under our assumptions. However, since
{Mν , ν ∈ V} ∈Mt,p, it is clear that {M˜
ν , ν ∈ V} satisfies the property stated
in (Z3), so that, as in step 5 of the proof of (GDP2), there is no loss of
generality in assuming that {M˜ν , ν ∈ V} ∈Mt,p+η . We conclude by noting
that (2.17) and (2.19) imply that (z, p− ε) ∈ Λ(t) for all ε > 0.
Step 3. We turn to the general case. For k ≥ 1, we now define ℓk :=
(ℓ ∧ k)∨ (−k), while Ik is again defined as in (2.16). We also set
nk =max{m≥ 0 :Bm(0)⊂ {ℓ= ℓk}} ∧ k
and note that the continuity of ℓ guarantees that limk→∞ nk =∞. Given a
bounded set O ⊂Rd and η > 0, we claim that
ess sup
(u,ν)∈U×V
|Ikη
O
(t, z,u, ν)− I(t, z,u, ν)| ≤ η
(2.20)
for all (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]×O
for any large enough integer kηO. Indeed, let (u, ν) ∈ U×V ; then
|Ik(t, z,u, ν)− I(t, z,u, ν)|
≤ E[|ℓ− ℓk|(Z
u,ν
t,z (T ))|Ft]
= E[|ℓ− ℓk|(Z
u,ν
t,z (T ))1{Zu,νt,z (T )/∈{ℓ=ℓk}}|Ft]
≤ E[|ℓ(Zu,νt,z (T ))|1{|Zu,νt,z (T )|>nk}|Ft]
≤CE[(1 + |Zu,νt,z (T )|
q)1{|Zu,νt,z (T )|>nk}|Ft]
by (2.3). We may assume that q > 0, as otherwise we are in the setting of
step 2. Pick δ > 0 such that q(1+ δ) = q¯. Then Ho¨lder’s inequality and (2.4)
yield that
E[|(Zu,νt,z (T ))|
q
1{|Zu,νt,z (T )|>nk}
|Ft]
≤ E[|(Zu,νt,z (T ))|
q¯|Ft]
1/(1+δ)
P{|Zu,νt,z (T )|>nk|Ft}
δ/(1+δ)
≤ ρ(z)q¯/(1+δ)(ρ(z)/nk)
q¯δ/(1+δ).
18 B. BOUCHARD, L. MOREAU AND M. NUTZ
Since ρ is locally bounded and limk→∞nk =∞, claim (2.20) follows. We can
then obtain (GDP1′) and (GDP2′) by reducing to the result of step 2, using
the same arguments as in the proof of step 2.
3. The PDE in the case of a controlled SDE. In this section, we illustrate
how our GDP can be used to derive a dynamic programming equation and
how its assumptions can be verified in a typical setup. To this end, we
focus on the case where the state process is determined by a stochastic
differential equation with controlled coefficients; however, other examples
could be treated similarly.
3.1. Setup. Let Ω = C([0, T ];Rd) be the canonical space of continuous
paths equipped with the Wiener measure P, let F = (Ft)t≤T be the P-
augmentation of the filtration generated by the coordinate-mapping process
W and let F = FT . We define V , the set of adverse controls, to be the set
of all progressively measurable processes with values in a compact subset V
of Rd. Similarly, U is the set of all progressively measurable processes with
values in a compact U ⊂ Rd. Finally, the set of strategies U consists of all
mappings u :V →U which are nonanticipating in the sense that
{ν1 =(0,s] ν2} ⊂ {u[ν1] =(0,s] u[ν2]} for all ν1, ν2 ∈ V and s≤ T .
Given (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd and (u, ν) ∈ U×V , we let Zu,νt,z be the unique strong
solution of the controlled SDE
Z(s) = z +
∫ s
t
µ(Z(r),u[ν]r, νr)dr+
∫ s
t
σ(Z(r),u[ν]r, νr)dWr,
(3.1)
s ∈ [t, T ],
where the coefficients
µ :Rd×U × V →Rd, σ :Rd×U × V →Rd×d
are assumed to be jointly continuous in all three variables, Lipschitz contin-
uous with linear growth in the first variable, uniformly in the last two and
Lipschitz continuous in the second variable, locally uniformly in the two
others. Throughout this section, we assume that ℓ :Rd→ R is a continuous
function of polynomial growth; that is, (2.3) holds true for some constants
C and q. Since Zu,νt,z (T ) has moments of all orders, this implies that the
finiteness condition (2.1) is satisfied.
In view of the martingale representation theorem, we can identify the
set Mt,p of martingales with the set A of all progressively measurable d-
dimensional processes α such that
∫
αdW is a (true) martingale. Indeed, we
have Mt,p = {P
α
t,p, α ∈A}, where
Pαt,p(·) = p+
∫ ·
t
αs dWs.
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We shall denote by A the set of all mappings a[·]: V 7→A such that
{ν1 =(0,s] ν2} ⊂ {a[ν1] =(0,s] a[ν2]} for all ν1, ν2 ∈ V and s≤ T .
The set of all families {P
a[ν]
t,p , ν ∈ V} with a ∈A then forms the set Mt,p, for
any given (t, p) ∈ [0, T ]×R. Furthermore, Tt consists of all families {τ
ν , ν ∈
V} ⊂ Tt such that, for some (z, p) ∈ R
d ×R, (u,a) ∈ U×A and some Borel
set O ⊂ [0, T ]×Rd ×R,
τν is the first exit time of (·,Zu,νt,z , P
a[ν]
t,p ) from O for all ν ∈ V .
(This includes the deterministic times s ∈ [t, T ] by the choice O = [0, s] ×
Rd ×R.) Finally, Ft consists of all families {A
ν , ν ∈ V} ⊂ Ft such that
Aν1 ∩ {ν1 =(0,t] ν2}=A
ν2 ∩ {ν1 =(0,t] ν2} for all ν1, ν2 ∈ V.
Proposition 3.1. The conditions of Corollary 2.3 are satisfied in the
present setup.
Proof. The above definitions readily yield that Assumptions (C) and
(Z1)–(Z3) are satisfied. Moreover, Assumption (Z4) can be verified exactly
as in [7], Proposition 3.3. Fix any q¯ > q ∨ 2; then (2.4) can be obtained as
follows. Let (u, ν) ∈ U× V and A ∈ Ft be arbitrary. Using the Burkholder–
Davis–Gundy inequalities, the boundedness of U and V and the assumptions
on µ and σ, we obtain that
E
[
sup
t≤s≤τ
|Zu,νt,z (s)|
q¯
1A
]
≤ cE
[
1A + |z|
q¯
1A +
∫ τ
t
sup
t≤s≤r
|Zu,νt,z (s)|
q¯
1A dr
]
,
where c is a universal constant, and τ is any stopping time such that
Zu,νt,z (· ∧ τ) is bounded. Applying Gronwall’s inequality and letting τ → T ,
we deduce that
E[|Zu,νt,z (T )|
q¯
1A]≤ E
[
sup
t≤u≤T
|Zu,νt,z (u)|
q¯
1A
]
≤ cE[(1 + |z|q¯)1A].
Since A ∈ Ft was arbitrary, this implies (2.4). To verify condition (2.5), we
note that the flow property yields
E[|Zu⊕su¯,ν⊕sν¯t,z (T )−Z
u¯,ν⊕sν¯
s,z′ (T )|1A] = E[|Z
u¯,ν⊕sν¯
s,Zu,νt,z (s)
(T )−Z u¯,ν⊕sν¯s,z′ (T )|1A]
and estimate the right-hand side with the above arguments. Finally, the
same arguments can be used to verify (R2). 
Remark 3.2. We emphasize that our definition of a strategy u ∈ U does
not include regularity assumptions on the mapping ν 7→ u[ν]. This is in con-
trast to [2], where a continuity condition is imposed, enabling the authors to
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deal with the selection problem for strategies in the context of a stochastic
differential game and use the traditional formulation of the value functions
in terms of infima (not essential infima) and suprema. Let us mention, how-
ever, that such regularity assumptions may preclude existence of optimal
strategies in concrete examples; see also Remark 4.3.
3.2. PDE for the reachability set Λ. In this section, we show how the
PDE for the reachability set Λ from (2.2) can be deduced from the geometric
dynamic programming principle of Corollary 2.3. This equation is stated in
terms of the indicator function of the complement of the graph of Λ,
χ(t, z, p) := 1− 1Λ(t)(z, p) =
{
0, if (z, p) ∈ Λ(t),
1, otherwise
and its lower semicontinuous envelope
χ∗(t, z, p) := lim inf
(t′,z′,p′)→(t,z,p)
χ(t′, z′, p′).
Corresponding results for the case without adverse player have been obtained
in [3, 25]; we extend their arguments to account for the presence of ν and the
fact that we only have a relaxed GDP. We begin by rephrasing Corollary 2.3
in terms of χ.
Lemma 3.3. Fix (t, z, p) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × R, and let O ⊂ [0, T ]×Rd ×R
be a bounded open set containing (t, z, p).
(GDP1χ) Assume that χ(t, z, p+ ε) = 0 for some ε > 0. Then there exist
u ∈ U and {αν , ν ∈ V} ⊂A such that
χ∗(τ
ν ,Zu,νt,z (τ
ν), Pα
ν
t,p (τ
ν)) = 0 P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V ,
where τν denotes the first exit time of (·,Zu,νt,z , P
αν
t,p ) from O.
(GDP2χ) Let ϕ be a continuous function such that ϕ≥ χ and let (u,a) ∈
U×A and η > 0 be such that
ϕ(τν ,Zu,νt,z (τ
ν), P
a[ν]
t,p (τ
ν))≤ 1− η P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V ,(3.2)
where τν denotes the first exit time of (·,Zu,νt,z , P
a[ν]
t,p ) from O. Then χ(t, z,
p− ε) = 0 for all ε > 0.
Proof. After observing that (z, p + ε) ∈ Λ(t) if and only if χ(t, z, p +
ε) = 0 and that (z, p) ∈ Λ¯(t) implies χ∗(t, z, p) = 0, (GDP1χ) follows from
Corollary 2.3, whose conditions are satisfied by Proposition 3.1. We now
prove (GDP2χ). Since ϕ is continuous and ∂O is compact, we can find ι > 0
such that
ϕ< 1 on a ι-neighborhood of ∂O ∩ {ϕ≤ 1− η}.
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As χ≤ ϕ, it follows that (3.2) implies
(Zu,νt,z (τ
ν),Mν(τν)) ∈Λι(τ
ν) P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V.
Now Corollary 2.3 yields that (z, p− ε) ∈ Λ(t); that is, χ(t, z, p− ε) = 0. 
Given a suitably differentiable function ϕ= ϕ(t, z, p) on [0, T ]×Rd+1, we
shall denote by ∂tϕ its derivative with respect to t and by Dϕ and D
2ϕ the
Jacobian and the Hessian matrix with respect to (z, p), respectively. Given
u ∈ U , a ∈Rd and v ∈ V , we can then define the Dynkin operator
Lu,a,v(Z,P )ϕ := ∂tϕ+ µ(Z,P )(·, u, v)
⊤Dϕ+ 12 Tr[σ(Z,P )σ
⊤
(Z,P )(·, u, a, v)D
2ϕ]
with coefficients
µ(Z,P ) :=
(
µ
0
)
, σ(Z,P )(·, a, ·) :=
(
σ
a
)
.
To introduce the associated relaxed Hamiltonians, we first define the relaxed
kernel
Nε(z, q, v) = {(u,a) ∈U ×R
d : |σ⊤(Z,P )(z,u, a, v)q| ≤ ε}, ε≥ 0
for z ∈Rd, q ∈Rd+1 and v ∈ V , as well as the set NLip(z, q) of all continuous
functions
(uˆ, aˆ) :Rd×Rd+1 × V → U ×Rd, (z′, q′, v′) 7→ (uˆ, aˆ)(z′, q′, v′)
that are locally Lipschitz continuous in (z′, q′), uniformly in v′ and satisfy
(uˆ, aˆ) ∈N0 on B × V for some neighborhood B of (z, q).
The local Lipschitz continuity will be used to ensure the local wellposedness
of the SDE for a Markovian strategy defined via (uˆ, aˆ). Setting
F (Θ, u, a, v) := {−µ(Z,P )(z,u, v)
⊤q− 12 Tr[σ(Z,P )σ
⊤
(Z,P )(z,u, a, v)A]}
for Θ = (z, q,A) ∈Rd×Rd+1× Sd+1 and (u,a, v) ∈ U ×Rd×V , we can then
define the relaxed Hamiltonians
H∗(Θ) := inf
v∈V
lim sup
εց0,Θ′→Θ
sup
(u,a)∈Nε(Θ′,v)
F (Θ′, u, a, v),(3.3)
H∗(Θ) := sup
(uˆ,aˆ)∈NLip(Θ)
inf
v∈V
F (Θ, uˆ(Θ, v), aˆ(Θ, v), v).(3.4)
[In (3.4), it is not necessary to take the relaxation Θ′→Θ because infv∈V F is
already lower semicontinuous.] The question whether H∗ =H∗ is postponed
to the monotone setting of the next section; see Remark 3.9.
We are now in the position to derive the PDE for χ; in the following, we
write H∗ϕ(t, z, p) for H∗(z,Dϕ(t, z, p),D2ϕ(t, z, p)), and similarly for H∗.
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Theorem 3.4. The function χ∗ is a viscosity supersolution on [0, T )×
Rd+1 of
(−∂t +H
∗)ϕ≥ 0.
The function χ∗ is a viscosity subsolution on [0, T )×Rd+1 of
(−∂t +H∗)ϕ≤ 0.
Proof. Step 1. χ∗ is a viscosity supersolution.
Let (to, zo, po) ∈ [0, T )×R
d×R, and let ϕ be a smooth function such that
(strict) min
[0,T )×Rd×R
(χ∗ − ϕ) = (χ∗ −ϕ)(to, zo, po) = 0.(3.5)
We suppose that
(−∂t +H
∗)ϕ(to, zo, po)≤−2η < 0(3.6)
for some η > 0 and work toward a contradiction. Using the continuity of µ
and σ and the definition of the upper-semicontinuous operator H∗, we can
find vo ∈ V and ε > 0 such that
−Lu,a,vo(Z,P )ϕ(t, z, p)≤−η
(3.7)
for all (u,a) ∈Nε(z,Dϕ(t, z, p), vo) and (t, z, p) ∈Bε,
where Bε :=Bε(to, zo, po) denotes the open ball of radius ε around (to, zo, po).
Let
∂Bε := {to + ε} ×Bε(zo, po)∪ [to, to + ε)× ∂Bε(zo, po)
denote the parabolic boundary of Bε, and set
ζ := min
∂Bε
(χ∗ −ϕ).
In view of (3.5), we have ζ > 0.
Next, we claim that there exists a sequence (tn, zn, pn, εn)n≥1 ⊂ Bε×(0,1)
such that
(tn, zn, pn, εn)→ (to, zo, po,0) and
(3.8)
χ(tn, zn, pn + εn) = 0 for all n≥ 1.
In view of χ ∈ {0,1}, it suffices to show that
χ∗(to, zo, po) = 0.(3.9)
Suppose that χ∗(to, zo, po) > 0; then the lower semicontinuity of χ∗ yields
that χ∗ > 0 and therefore χ = 1 on a neighborhood of (to, zo, po), which
implies that ϕ has a strict local maximum in (to, zo, po) and thus
∂tϕ(to, zo, po)≤ 0, Dϕ(to, zo, po) = 0, D
2ϕ(to, zo, po)≤ 0.
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This clearly contradicts (3.7), and so the claim follows.
For any n ≥ 1, the equality in (3.8) and (GDP1χ) of Lemma 3.3 yield
un ∈ U and {αn,ν , ν ∈ V} ⊂A such that
χ∗(t∧ τn,Z
n(t ∧ τn), P
n(t ∧ τn)) = 0, t≥ tn,(3.10)
where
(Zn(s), Pn(s)) := (Zu
n,vo
tn,zn (s), P
αn,vo
tn,pn (s))
and
τn := inf{s≥ tn : (s,Z
n(s), Pn(s)) /∈Bε}.
(In the above, vo ∈ V is viewed as a constant element of V .) By (3.10), (3.5)
and the definitions of ζ and τn,
−ϕ(·,Zn, Pn)(t ∧ τn) = (χ∗ − ϕ)(·,Z
n, Pn)(t ∧ τn)≥ ζ1{t≥τn} ≥ 0.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to −ϕ(·,Zn, Pn), we deduce that
Sn(t) := Sn(0) +
∫ t∧τn
tn
δn(r)dr+
∫ t∧τn
tn
Σn(r)dWr ≥−ζ1{t<τn},(3.11)
where
Sn(0) :=−ζ −ϕ(tn, zn, pn),
δn(r) :=−L
unr [vo],α
n,vo
r ,vo
(Z,P ) ϕ(r,Z
n(r), Pn(r)),
Σn(r) :=−Dϕ(r,Z
n(r), Pn(r))⊤σ(Z,P )(Z
n(r),unr [vo], α
n,vo
r , vo).
Define the set
An := [[tn, τn]]∩ {δn >−η};
then (3.7) and the definition of Nε imply that
|Σn|> ε on An.(3.12)
Lemma 3.5. After diminishing ε > 0 if necessary, the stochastic expo-
nential
En(·) = E
(
−
∫ ·∧τn
tn
δn(r)
|Σn(r)|2
Σn(r)1An(r)dWr
)
is well defined and a true martingale for all n≥ 1.
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This lemma is proved below; it fills a gap in the previous literature. Ad-
mitting its result for the moment, integration by parts yields
(EnSn)(t ∧ τn) = Sn(0) +
∫ t∧τn
tn
Enδn1Acn dr
+
∫ t∧τn
tn
En
(
Σn − Sn
δn
|Σn|2
Σn1An
)
dW.
As En ≥ 0, it then follows from the definition of An that Enδn1Acn ≤ 0 and so
EnSn is a local supermartingale; in fact, it is a true supermartingale since
it is bounded from below by the martingale −ζEn. In view of (3.11), we
deduce that
−ζ−ϕ(tn, zn, pn) = (EnSn)(tn)≥ E[(EnSn)(τn)]≥−ζE[1{τn<τn}En(τn)] = 0,
which yields a contradiction due to ζ > 0 and the fact that, by (3.9),
ϕ(tn, zn, pn)→ ϕ(to, zo, po) = χ∗(to, zo, po) = 0.
Step 2. χ∗ is a viscosity subsolution.
Let (to, zo, po) ∈ [0, T )×R
d×R and let ϕ be a smooth function such that
max
[0,T )×Rd×R
(χ∗ −ϕ) = (χ∗ −ϕ)(to, zo, po) = 0.
In order to prove that (−∂t +H∗)ϕ(to, zo, po)≤ 0, we assume for contradic-
tion that
(−∂t +H∗)ϕ(to, zo, po)> 0.(3.13)
An argument analogous to the proof of (3.9) shows that χ∗(to, zo, po) = 1.
Consider a sequence (tn, zn, pn, εn)n≥1 in [0, T )×R
d×R× (0,1) such that
(tn, zn, pn − εn, εn)→ (to, zo, po,0)
and
χ(tn, zn, pn − εn)→ χ
∗(to, zo, po) = 1.
Since χ takes values in {0,1}, we must have
χ(tn, zn, pn − εn) = 1(3.14)
for all n large enough. Set
ϕ˜(t, z, p) := ϕ(t, z, p) + |t− to|
2 + |z − zo|
4 + |p− po|
4.
Then inequality (3.13) and the definition of H∗ imply that we can find (uˆ, aˆ)
in NLip(·,Dϕ˜)(to, zo, po) such that
inf
v∈V
(−L
(uˆ,aˆ)(·,Dϕ˜,v),v
(Z,P ) ϕ˜)≥ 0 on Bε :=Bε(to, zo, po)(3.15)
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for some ε > 0. By the definition of NLip, after possibly changing ε > 0, we
have
(uˆ, aˆ)(·,Dϕ˜, ·) ∈N0(·,Dϕ˜, ·) on Bε × V.(3.16)
Moreover, we have
ϕ˜≥ ϕ+ η on ∂Bε(3.17)
for some η > 0. Since ϕ˜(tn, zn, pn)→ ϕ(to, zo, po) = χ
∗(to, zo, po) = 1, we can
find n such that
ϕ˜(tn, zn, pn)≤ 1 + η/2(3.18)
and such that (3.14) is satisfied. We fix this n for the remainder of the proof.
For brevity, we write (uˆ, aˆ)(t, z, p, v) for (uˆ, aˆ)(z,Dϕ˜(t, z, p), v) in the se-
quel. Exploiting the definition of NLip, we can then define the mapping
(uˆ, aˆ)[·] :V →U ×A implicitly via
(uˆ, aˆ)[ν] = (uˆ, aˆ)(·,Z
uˆ[ν],ν
tn,zn , P
aˆ[ν]
tn,pn , ν)1[tn,τν ],
where
τν := inf{r≥ tn : (r,Z
uˆ[ν],ν
tn,zn (r), P
aˆ[ν]
tn,pn(r)) /∈Bε}.
We observe that uˆ and aˆ are nonanticipating; that is, (uˆ, aˆ) ∈ U×A. Let us
write (Zν , P ν) for (Z uˆ,νtn,zn , P
aˆ[ν]
tn,pn) to alleviate the notation. Since χ≤ χ
∗ ≤ ϕ,
the continuity of the paths of Zν and P ν and (3.17) lead to
ϕ(τν ,Zν(τν), P ν(τν))≤ ϕ˜(τν ,Zν(τν), P ν(τν))− η.
On the other hand, in view of (3.15) and (3.16), Itoˆ’s formula applied to ϕ˜
on [tn, τ
ν ] yields that
ϕ˜(τν ,Zν(τν), P ν(τν))≤ ϕ˜(tn, zn, pn).
Therefore, the previous inequality and (3.18) show that
ϕ(τν ,Zν(τν), P ν(τν))≤ ϕ˜(tn, zn, pn)− η ≤ 1− η/2.
By (GDP2χ) of Lemma 3.3, we deduce that χ(tn, zn, pn − εn) = 0, which
contradicts (3.14). 
To complete the proof of the theorem, we still need to show Lemma 3.5.
To this end, we first make the following observation.
Lemma 3.6. Let α ∈ L2loc(W ) be such that M =
∫
αdW is a bounded
martingale and let β be an Rd-valued, progressively measurable process such
that |β| ≤ c(1 + |α|) for some constant c. Then the stochastic exponential
E(
∫
β dW ) is a true martingale.
26 B. BOUCHARD, L. MOREAU AND M. NUTZ
Proof. The assumption clearly implies that
∫ T
0 |βs|
2 ds <∞ P-a.s. Since
M is bounded, we have in particular that M ∈ BMO ; that is,
sup
τ∈T0
∥∥∥∥E
[∫ T
τ
|αs|
2 ds
∣∣∣Fτ
]∥∥∥∥
∞
<∞.
In view of the assumption, the same holds with α replaced by β, so that∫
β dW is in BMO . This implies that E(
∫
β dW ) is a true martingale; cf.
[14], Theorem 2.3. 
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Consider the process
βn(r) :=
δn(r)
|Σn(r)|2
Σn(r)1An(r);
we show that
|βn| ≤ c(1 + |α
n,vo |) on [[tn, τn]](3.19)
for some c > 0. Then the result will follow by applying Lemma 3.6 to
αn,vo1[[tn,τn]]; note that the stochastic integral of this process is bounded
by the definition of τn. To prove (3.19), we distinguish two cases.
Case 1. ∂pϕ(to, zo, po) 6= 0. Using that µ and σ are continuous and that
U and Bε are bounded, tracing the definitions yields that
|δn| ≤ c{1 + |α
n,vo |+ |αn,vo |2|∂ppϕ(·,Z
n, Pn)|} on [[tn, τn]],
while
|Σn| ≥ −c+ |α
n,vo ||∂pϕ(·,Z
n, Pn)| on [[tn, τn]]
for some c > 0. Since ∂pϕ(to, zo, po) 6= 0 by assumption, ∂pϕ is uniformly
bounded away from zero on Bε, after diminishing ε > 0 if necessary. Hence,
recalling (3.12), there is a cancelation between |δn| and |Σn| which allows us
to conclude (3.19).
Case 2. ∂pϕ(to, zo, po) = 0. We first observe that
δ+n ≤ c(1 + |α
n,vo |)− c−1|αn,vo |2∂ppϕ(·,Z
n, Pn) on [[tn, τn]]
for some c > 0. Since δ−n and |Σn|
−1 are uniformly bounded on An, it there-
fore suffices to show that ∂ppϕ ≥ 0 on Bε. To see this, we note that (3.6)
and the relaxation in the definition (3.3) of H∗ imply that there exists ι > 0
such that, for some v ∈ V and all small ε > 0,
− ∂tϕ(to, zo, po) +F (Θ
ι, u, a, v)≤−η for all (u,a) ∈Nε(Θ
ι),(3.20)
where Θι = (z0, p0,Dϕ,A
ι) and Aι is the same matrix as D2ϕ(to, zo, po)
except that the entry ∂ppϕ(to, zo, po) is replaced by ∂ppϕ(to, zo, po)− ι. Going
back to the definition of Nε, we observe that Nε(Θ
ι) does not depend on ι
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and, which is the crucial part, the assumption that ∂pϕ(to, zo, po) = 0 implies
that Nε(Θ
ι) is of the form NU ×Rd; that is, the variable a is unconstrained.
Now (3.20) and the last observation show that
−(∂ppϕ(to, zo, po)− ι)|a|
2 ≤ c(1 + |a|)
for all a ∈Rd, so we deduce that ∂ppϕ(to, zo, po)≥ ι > 0. Thus, after dimin-
ishing ε > 0 if necessary, we have ∂ppϕ≥ 0 on Bε as desired. This completes
the proof. 
3.3. PDE in the monotone case. We now specialize the setup of Sec-
tion 3.1 to the case where the state process Z consists of a pair of processes
(X,Y ) with values in Rd−1 ×R, and the loss function
ℓ :Rd−1×R→R, (x, y) 7→ ℓ(x, y)
is nondecreasing in the scalar variable y. This setting, which was previously
studied in [3] for the case without adverse control, will allow for a more
explicit description of Λ which is particularly suitable for applications in
mathematical finance.
For (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd−1×R and (u, ν) ∈ U ×V , let Zu,νt,x,y = (X
u,ν
t,x , Y
u,ν
t,x,y)
be the strong solution of (3.1) with
µ(x, y, u, v) :=
(
µX(x,u, v)
µY (x, y, u, v)
)
, σ(x, y, u, v) :=
(
σX(x,u, v)
σY (x, y, u, v)
)
,
where µY and σY take values in R and R
1×d, respectively. The assumptions
from Section 3.1 remain in force; in particular, the continuity and growth
assumptions on µ and σ. In this setup, we can consider the real-valued
function
γ(t, x, p) := inf{y ∈R : (x, y, p)∈ Λ(t)}.
In mathematical finance, this may describe the minimal capital y such that
the given target can be reached by trading in the securities market modeled
by Xu,νt,x ; an illustration is given in the subsequent section. In the present
context, Corollary 2.3 reads as follows.
Lemma 3.7. Fix (t, x, y, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd−1 × R × R, let O ⊂ [0, T ] ×
Rd−1 ×R×R be a bounded open set containing (t, x, y, p) and assume that
γ is locally bounded.
(GDP1γ) Assume that y > γ(t, x, p+ ε) for some ε > 0. Then there exist
u ∈ U and {αν , ν ∈ V} ⊂A such that
Y u,νt,x,y(τ
ν)≥ γ∗(τ,X
u,ν
t,x (τ
ν), Pα
ν
t,p (τ
ν)) P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V,
where τν is the first exit time of (·,Xu,νt,x , Y
u,ν
t,x,y, P
αν
t,p ) from O.
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(GDP2γ) Let ϕ be a continuous function such that ϕ≥ γ and let (u,a) ∈
U×A and η > 0 be such that
Y u,νt,x,y(τ
ν)≥ ϕ(τν ,Xu,νt,x (τ
ν), P
a[ν]
t,p (τ
ν)) + η P-a.s. for all ν ∈ V ,
where τν is the first exit time of (·,Xu,νt,x , Y
u,ν
t,x,y, P
a[ν]
t,p ) from O. Then y ≥
γ(t, x, p− ε) for all ε > 0.
Proof. Noting that y > γ(t, x, p) implies (x, y, p) ∈ Λ(t) and that
(x, y, p) ∈ Λ(t) implies y ≥ γ(t, x, p), the result follows from Corollary 2.3
by arguments similar to the proof of Lemma 3.3. 
The Hamiltonians G∗ and G∗ for the PDE describing γ are defined like
H∗ and H∗ in (3.3) and (3.4), but with
F (Θ, u, a, v)
:= {µY (x, y, u, v)− µ(X,P )(x,u, v)
⊤q− 12 Tr[σ(X,P )σ
⊤
(X,P )(x,u, a, v)A]},
where Θ := (x, y, q,A) ∈Rd−1 ×R×Rd × Sd and
µ(X,P )(x,u, a, v) :=
(
µX(x,u, v)
0
)
, σ(X,P )(x,u, a, v) :=
(
σX(x,u, v)
a
)
with the relaxed kernel Nε replaced by
Kε(x, y, q, v) := {(u,a) ∈U ×R
d : |σY (x, y, u, v)− q
⊤σ(X,P )(x,u, a, v)| ≤ ε}
and NLip replaced by a set KLip, defined like NLip but in terms of K0 instead
of N0. We then have the following result for the semicontinuous envelopes
γ∗ and γ∗ of γ.
Theorem 3.8. Assume that γ is locally bounded. Then γ∗ is a viscosity
supersolution on [0, T )×Rd−1 ×R of
(−∂t +G
∗)ϕ≥ 0
and γ∗ is a viscosity subsolution on [0, T )×Rd−1 ×R of
(−∂t +G∗)ϕ≤ 0.
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 3.7 by adapting the proof of [3],
Theorem 2.1, using the arguments from the proof of Theorem 3.4 to account
for the game-theoretic setting and the relaxed formulation of the GDP. We
therefore omit the details. 
We shall not discuss in this generality the boundary conditions as t→ T ;
they are somewhat complicated to state but can be deduced similarly as
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in [3]. Obtaining a comparison theorem at the present level of generality
seems difficult, mainly due to the presence of the sets Kε and KLip (which
depend on the solution itself) and the discontinuity of the nonlinearities at
∂pϕ= 0. It seems more appropriate to treat this question on a case-by-case
basis. In fact, once G∗ =G∗ (see also Remark 3.9), the challenges in proving
comparison are similar as in the case without adverse player. For that case,
comparison results have been obtained, for example, in [5] for a specific
setting; see also the references therein for more examples.
Remark 3.9. Let us discuss briefly the question whether G∗ = G∗.
We shall focus on the case where U is convex and the (nondecreasing)
function γ is strictly increasing with respect to p; in this case, we are
interested only in test functions ϕ with ∂pϕ > 0. Under this condition,
(u,a) ∈ Kε(·, ϕ, (∂xϕ,∂pϕ), v) if and only if there exists ζ with |ζ| ≤ 1 such
that a = (∂pϕ)
−1(σY (·, ϕ,u, v) − ∂xϕ
⊤σX(·, u, v)− εζ). From this, it is not
hard to see that for such functions, the relaxation εց 0,Θ′→Θ in (3.3) is
superfluous as the operator is already continuous, so we are left with the
question whether
inf
v∈V
sup
(u,a)∈K0(Θ,v)
F (Θ, u, a, v) = sup
(uˆ,aˆ)∈KLip(Θ)
inf
v∈V
F (Θ, uˆ(Θ, v), aˆ(Θ, v), v).
The inequality “≥” is clear. The converse inequality will hold if, say, for
each ε > 0, there exists a locally Lipschitz mapping (uˆε, aˆε) ∈KLip such that
F (·, (uˆε, aˆε)(·, v), v)≥ sup
(u,a)∈K0(·,v)
F (·, u, a, v)− ε for all v ∈ V.
Conditions for the existence of ε-optimal continuous selectors can be found
in [15], Theorem 3.2. If (uε, aε) is an ε-optimal continuous selector, the
definition of K0 entails that a
⊤
ε (Θ, v)qp = −σ
⊤
X(x,uε(Θ, v), v)qx + σY (x, y,
uε(Θ, v), v), where we use the notation Θ = (x, y, p, (q
⊤
x , qp)
⊤,A). Then uε
can be further approximated, uniformly on compact sets, by a locally Lip-
schitz function uˆε. We may restrict our attention to qp > 0; so that, if
we assume that σ⊤ is (jointly) locally Lipschitz, the mapping aˆ⊤ε (Θ, v) :=
(qp)
−1(−σ⊤X(x, uˆε(Θ, v), v)qx + σY (x, y, uˆε(Θ, v), v)) is locally Lipschitz, and
then (uˆε, aˆε) defines a sufficiently good, locally Lipschitz continuous selector:
for all v ∈ V ,
F (·, (uˆε, aˆε)(·, v), v) ≥ F (·, (uε, aε)(·, v), v)−Oε(1)
≥ sup
(u,a)∈K0
F (·, u, a, v)− ε−Oε(1)
on a neighborhood of Θ, where Oε(1)→ 0 as ε→ 0. One can similarly dis-
cuss other cases, for example, when γ is strictly concave (instead of increas-
ing) with respect to p and the mapping (x, y, qx, u, v) 7→ −σ
⊤
X(x,u, v)qx +
σY (x, y, u, v) is invertible in u, with an inverse, that is, locally Lipschitz,
uniformly in v.
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4. Application to hedging under uncertainty. In this section, we illus-
trate our general results in a concrete example, and use the opportunity to
show how to extend them to a case with unbounded strategies. To this end,
we shall consider a problem of partial hedging under Knightian uncertainty.
More precisely, the uncertainty concerns the drift and volatility coefficients
of the risky asset, and we aim at controlling a function of the hedging er-
ror; the corresponding worst-case analysis is equivalent to a game where
the adverse player chooses the coefficients. This problem is related to the
G-expectation from [22, 23], the second order target problem from [26] and
the problem of optimal arbitrage studied in [11]. We let
V = [µ,µ]× [σ,σ]
be the possible values of the coefficients, where µ ≤ 0 ≤ µ and σ ≥ σ ≥ 0.
Moreover, U = R will be the possible values for the investment policy, so
that, in contrast to the previous sections, U is not bounded.
The notation is the same as in the previous section, except for an integra-
bility condition for the strategies that will be introduced below to account
for the unboundedness of U ; moreover, we shall sometimes write ν = (µ,σ)
for an adverse control ν ∈ V . Given (µ,σ) ∈ V and u ∈ U, the state process
Zu,νt,x,y = (X
ν
t,x, Y
u,ν
t,y ) is governed by
dXνt,x(r)
Xνt,x(r)
= µr dr+ σr dWr, X
ν
t,x(t) = x
and
dY u,νt,y (r) = u[ν]r(µr dr+ σr dWr), Y
u,ν
t,y (t) = y.
To wit, the process Xνt,x represents the price of a risky asset with unknown
drift and volatility coefficients (µ,σ), while Y u,νt,y stands for the wealth process
associated to an investment policy u[ν], denominated in monetary amounts.
(The interest rate is zero for simplicity.) We remark that it is clearly neces-
sary to use strategies in this setup: even a simple stop-loss investment policy
cannot be implemented as a control.
Our loss function is of the form
ℓ(x, y) =Ψ(y − g(x)),
where Ψ, g :R→R are continuous functions of polynomial growth. The func-
tion Ψ is also assumed to be strictly increasing and concave, with an inverse
Ψ−1 :R→R, that is, again of polynomial growth. As a consequence, ℓ is
continuous and (2.3) is satisfied for some q > 0; that is,
|ℓ(z)| ≤C(1 + |z|q), z = (x, y) ∈R2.(4.1)
We interpret g(Xνt,x(T )) as the random payoff of a European option written
on the risky asset, for a given realization of the drift and volatility processes,
STOCHASTIC TARGET GAMES WITH CONTROLLED LOSS 31
while Ψ quantifies the disutility of the hedging error Y u,νt,y (T )− g(X
ν
t,x(T )).
In this setup,
γ(t, x, p)
= inf{y ∈R :∃u∈ U s.t. E[Ψ(Y u,νt,y (T )− g(X
ν
t,x(T )))|Ft]≥ p P-a.s. ∀ν ∈ V}
is the minimal price for the option allowing to find a hedging policy such
that the expected disutility of the hedging error is controlled by p.
We fix a finite constant q¯ > q ∨ 2 and define U to be the set of map-
pings u :V →U that are nonanticipating (as in Section 3) and satisfy the
integrability condition
sup
ν∈V
E
[∣∣∣∣
∫ T
0
|u[ν]r|
2 dr
∣∣∣∣
q¯/2]
<∞.(4.2)
The conclusions below do not depend on the choice of q¯. The main result of
this section is an explicit expression for the price γ(t, x, p).
Theorem 4.1. Let (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ]× (0,∞)×R. Then γ(t, x, p) is finite
and given by
γ(t, x, p) = sup
ν∈V0
E[g(Xνt,x(T ))] + Ψ
−1(p)
(4.3)
where V0 = {(µ,σ) ∈ V :µ≡ 0}.
In particular, γ(t, x, p) coincides with the superhedging price for the shifted
option g(·) + Ψ−1(p) in the (driftless) uncertain volatility model for [σ,σ];
see also below. That is, the drift uncertainty has no impact on the price,
provided that µ ≤ 0 ≤ µ. Let us remark, in this respect, that the present
setup corresponds to an investor who knows the present and historical drift
and volatility of the underlying. It may also be interesting to study the case
where only the trajectories of the underlying (and therefore the volatility,
but not necessarily the drift) are observed. This, however, does not corre-
spond to the type of game studied in this paper.
4.1. Proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof of “≥” in (4.3). We may assume that γ(t, x, p)<∞. Let y >
γ(t, x, p); then there exists u ∈ U such that
E[Ψ(Y u,νt,y (T )− g(X
ν
t,x(T )))]≥ p for all ν ∈ V.
As Ψ is concave, it follows by Jensen’s inequality that
Ψ(E[Y u,νt,y (T )− g(X
ν
t,x(T ))])≥ p for all ν ∈ V.
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Since the integrability condition (4.2) implies that Y u,νt,y is a martingale for
all ν ∈ V0, we conclude that
Ψ(y− E[g(Xνt,x(T ))])≥ p for all ν ∈ V
0
and hence y ≥ supν∈V0 E[g(X
ν
t,x(T ))] + Ψ
−1(p). As y > γ(t, x, p) was arbi-
trary, the claim follows. 
We shall use Theorem 3.8 to derive the missing inequality in (4.3). Since
U = R is unbounded, we introduce a sequence of approximating problems
γn defined like γ, but with strategies bounded by n,
γn(t, x, p) := inf{y ∈R :∃u∈ U
n s.t. E[ℓ(Zu,νt,x,y(T ))|Ft]≥ p P-a.s. ∀ν ∈ V},
where
Un = {u ∈ U : |u[ν]| ≤ n for all ν ∈ V}.
Then clearly γn is decreasing in n and
γn ≥ γ, n≥ 1.(4.4)
Lemma 4.2. Let (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]× (0,∞)×R, u ∈ U, and define un ∈ U by
un[ν] := u[ν]1{|u[ν]|≤n}, ν ∈ V.
Then
ess sup
ν∈V
|E[ℓ(Zun,νt,z (T ))− ℓ(Z
u,ν
t,z (T ))|Ft]| → 0 in L
1 as n→∞.
Proof. Using monotone convergence and an argument as in the proof
of step 1 in Section 2.3, we obtain that
E
{
ess sup
ν∈V
|E[ℓ(Zun,νt,z (T ))− ℓ(Z
u,ν
t,z (T ))|Ft]|
}
= sup
ν∈V
E{|ℓ(Zun,νt,z (T ))− ℓ(Z
u,ν
t,z (T ))|}.
Since V is bounded, the Burkholder–Davis–Gundy inequalities show that
there is a universal constant c > 0 such that
E{|Zun,νt,z (T )−Z
u,ν
t,z (T )|} ≤ cE
[∫ T
t
|u[ν]r − un[ν]r|
2 dr
]1/2
= cE
[∫ T
t
|u[ν]r1{|u[ν]r |>n}|
2 dr
]1/2
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and hence (4.2) and Ho¨lder’s inequality yield that, for any given δ > 0,
sup
ν∈V
P{|Zun,νt,z (T )−Z
u,ν
t,z (T )|> δ}
(4.5)
≤ δ−1 sup
ν∈V
E{|Zun,νt,z (T )−Z
u,ν
t,z (T )|} → 0
for n→∞. Similarly, the Burkholder–Davis–Gundy inequalities and (4.2)
show that {|Zun,νt,z (T )|+ |Z
u,ν
t,z (T )|, ν ∈ V, n≥ 1} is bounded in L
q¯. This yields,
on the one hand, that
sup
ν∈V ,n≥1
P{|Zun,νt,z (T )|+ |Z
u,ν
t,z (T )|> k}→ 0(4.6)
for k→∞, and on the other hand, in view of (4.1) and q¯ > q, that
{ℓ(Zun,νt,z (T ))− ℓ(Z
u,ν
t,z (T )) :ν ∈ V, n≥ 1} is uniformly integrable.(4.7)
Let ε > 0; then (4.6) and (4.7) show that we can choose k > 0 such that
sup
ν∈V
E[|ℓ(Zun,νt,z (T ))− ℓ(Z
u,ν
t,z (T ))|1{|Zun,νt,z (T )|+|Z
u,ν
t,z (T )|>k}
]< ε
for all n. Using also that ℓ is uniformly continuous on {|z| ≤ k}, we thus find
δ > 0 such that
sup
ν∈V
E[|ℓ(Zun,νt,z (T ))− ℓ(Z
u,ν
t,z (T ))|]
≤ 2ε+ sup
ν∈V
E[|ℓ(Zun,νt,z (T ))− ℓ(Z
u,ν
t,z (T ))|1{|Zun,νt,z (T )−Z
u,ν
t,z (T )|>δ}
].
By (4.5) and (4.7), the supremum on the right-hand side tends to zero as
n→∞. This completes the proof of Lemma 4.2. 
Proof of “≤” in (4.3). It follows from the polynomial growth of g
and the boundedness of V that the right-hand side of (4.3) is finite. Thus
the already established inequality “≥” in (4.3) yields that γ(t, x, p)>−∞.
We now show the theorem under the hypothesis that γ(t, x, p)<∞ for all
p; we shall argue at the end of the proof that this is automatically satisfied.
Step 1. Let γ∞ := infn γn. Then the upper semicontinuous envelopes of γ
and γ∞ coincide: γ
∗ = γ∗∞.
It follows from (4.4) that γ∗∞ ≥ γ
∗. Let η > 0 and y > γ(t, x, p+ η). We
show that y ≥ γn(t, x, p) for n large; this will imply the remaining inequality
γ∗∞ ≤ γ
∗. Indeed, the definition of γ and Lemma 4.2 imply that we can find
u ∈ U and un ∈ U
n such that
J(t, x, y,un)≥ J(t, x, y,u)− ǫn ≥ p+ η− ǫn P-a.s.,
where ǫn→ 0 in L
1. If Kn is defined like K, but with U
n instead of U, then
it follows that Kn(t, x, y)≥ p+ η− ǫn P-a.s. Recalling that Kn is determin-
istic (cf. Proposition 3.1), we may replace ǫn by E[ǫn] in this inequality.
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Sending n→∞, we then see that limn→∞Kn(t, x, y)≥ p+ η, and therefore
Kn(t, x, y)≥ p+ η/2 for n large enough. The fact that y ≥ γn(t, x, p) for n
large then follows from the same considerations as in Lemma 2.4.
Step 2. The relaxed semi-limit
γ¯∗∞(t, x, p) := limsup
n→∞
(t′,x′,p′)→(t,x,p)
γ∗n(t
′, x′, p′)
is a viscosity subsolution on [0, T )× (0,∞)×R of
− ∂tϕ+ inf
σ∈[σ,σ]
{
−
1
2
σ2x2∂xxϕ
}
≤ 0(4.8)
and satisfies the boundary condition γ¯∗∞(T,x, p)≤ g(x) +Ψ
−1(p).
We first show that the boundary condition is satisfied. Fix (x, p) ∈ (0,∞)×
R and let y > g(x) +Ψ−1(p); then ℓ(x, y)> p. Let (tn, xn, pn)→ (T,x, p) be
such that γn(tn, xn, pn)→ γ¯
∗
∞(T,x, p). We consider the strategy u ≡ 0 and
use the arguments from the proof of Proposition 3.1 to find a constant c
independent of n such that
ess sup
ν∈V
E[|Z0,νtn,xn,y(T )− (x, y)|
q¯|Ftn ]≤ c(|T − tn|
q¯/2 + |x− xn|
q¯).
Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.2, this implies that there exist constants
εn→ 0 such that
J(tn, xn, y,0)≥ ℓ(x, y)− εn P-a.s.
In view of ℓ(x, y)> p, this shows that y ≥ γn(tn, xn, pn) for n large enough,
and hence that y ≥ γ¯∗∞(T,x, p). As a result, we have γ¯
∗
∞(T,x, p) ≤ g(x) +
Ψ−1(p).
It remains to show the subsolution property. Let ϕ be a smooth function,
and let (to, xo, po) ∈ [0, T )× (0,∞)×R be such that
(γ¯∗∞ −ϕ)(to, xo, po) = max(γ¯
∗
∞ −ϕ) = 0.
After passing to a subsequence, [1], Lemma 4.2, yields (tn, xn, pn)→ (to, xo, po)
such that
lim
n→∞
(γ∗n − ϕ)(tn, xn, pn) = (γ¯
∗
∞ −ϕ)(to, xo, po)
and such that (tn, xn, pn) is a local maximizer of (γ
∗
n−ϕ). Applying Theorem
3.8 to γ∗n, we deduce that
sup
(uˆ,aˆ)∈KnLip(·,Dϕ)
inf
(µ,σ)∈V
Gϕ(·, (uˆ, aˆ)(µ,σ), (µ,σ))(tn, xn, pn)≤ 0,(4.9)
where
Gϕ(·, (u,a), (µ,σ))
:= uµ− ∂tϕ− µx∂xϕ−
1
2 (σ
2x2∂xxϕ+ a
2∂ppϕ+2σxa∂xpϕ)
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and KnLip(·,Dϕ)(tn, xn, pn) is the set of locally Lipschitz mappings (uˆ, aˆ)
with values in [−n,n]×R such that
σuˆ(x, qx, qp, µ, σ) = xσqx + qpaˆ(x, qx, qp, µ, σ) for all σ ∈ [σ,σ]
for all (x, (qx, qp)) in a neighborhood of (xn,Dϕ(tn, xn, pn)). Since the map-
ping
(0,∞)×R2 × [µ,µ]× [σ,σ]→R2 (x, qx, qp, µ, σ) 7→ (xqx,0)
belongs to KnLip(·,Dϕ)(tn, xn, pn) for n large enough, (4.9) leads to
−∂tϕ+ inf
σ∈[σ,σ]
{
−
1
2
σ2x2∂xxϕ
}
(tn, xn, pn)≤ 0
for n large. Here the nonlinearity is continuous; therefore, sending n→∞
yields (4.8).
Step 3. We have γ¯∗∞ ≤ π on [0, T ]× (0,∞)×R, where
π(t, x, p) := sup
ν∈V0
E[g(Xνt,x(T ))] + Ψ
−1(p)
is the right-hand side of (4.3).
Indeed, our assumptions on g and Ψ−1 imply that π is continuous with
polynomial growth. It then follows by standard arguments that π is a vis-
cosity supersolution on [0, T )× (0,∞)×R of
−∂tϕ+ inf
σ∈[σ,σ]
{
−
1
2
σ2x2∂xxϕ
}
≥ 0
and clearly the boundary condition π(T,x, p) ≥ g(x) + Ψ−1(p) is satisfied.
The claim then follows from step 2 by comparison.
We can now deduce the theorem: we have γ ≤ γ∗ by the definition of γ∗
and γ∗ = γ∗∞ by step 1. As γ
∗
∞ ≤ γ¯
∗
∞ by construction, step 3 yields the result.
It remains to show that γ <∞. Indeed, this is clearly satisfied when g is
bounded from above. For the general case, we consider gm = g ∧m and let
γm be the corresponding value function. Given η > 0, we have γm(t, x, p+
η) <∞ for all m and so (4.3) holds for gm. We see from (4.3) that y :=
1+ supm γm(t, x, p+ η) is finite. Thus, there exist um ∈ U such that
E[Ψ(Y um,νt,y (T )− gm(X
ν
t,x(T )))|Ft]≥ p+ η for all ν ∈ V.
Using once more the boundedness of V , we see that for m large enough,
E[Ψ(Y um,νt,y (T )− g(X
ν
t,x(T )))|Ft]≥ p for all ν ∈ V,
which shows that γ(t, x, p)≤ y <∞. 
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Remark 4.3. We sketch a probabilistic proof for the inequality “≤”
in Theorem 4.1, for the special case without drift (µ = µ = 0) and σ >
0. We focus on t = 0, and recall that y0 := supν∈V0 E[g(X
ν
0,x(T ))] is the
superhedging price for g(·) in the uncertain volatility model. More precisely,
if B is the coordinate-mapping process on Ω = C([0, T ];R), there exists an
FB-progressively measurable process ϑ such that
y0 +
∫ T
0
ϑs
dBs
Bs
≥ g(BT ) P
ν-a.s. for all ν ∈ V0,
where P ν is the law of Xν0,x under P ; see, for example, [20]. Seeing ϑ as an
adapted functional of B, this implies that
y0+
∫ T
0
ϑs(X
ν
0,x)
dXν0,x(s)
Xν0,x(s)
≥ g(Xν0,x(T )) P -a.s. for all ν ∈ V
0.
Since Xν0,x is nonanticipating with respect to ν, we see that u[ν]s := ϑs(X
ν
0,x)
defines a nonanticipating strategy such that, with y := y0 +Ψ
−1(p),
y +
∫ T
0
u[ν]s
dXν0,x(s)
Xν0,x(s)
≥ g(Xν0,x(T )) +Ψ
−1(p);
that is,
Ψ(Y u,ν0,y (T )− g(X
ν
0,x(T )))≥ p
holds even P -almost surely, rather than only in expectation, for all ν ∈ V0,
and V0 = V because of our assumption that µ = µ = 0. In particular, we
have the existence of an optimal strategy u. (We notice that, in this respect,
it is important that our definition of strategies does not contain regularity
assumptions on ν 7→ u[ν].)
Heuristically, the case with drift uncertainty (i.e., µ 6= µ) can be reduced
to the above by a Girsanov change of measure argument; for example, if
µ is deterministic, then we can take u[(µ,σ)] := u[(0, σµ)], where σµ(ω) :=
σ(ω+
∫
µt dt). However, for general µ, there are difficulties related to the fact
that a Girsanov Brownian motion need not generate the original filtration
(see, e.g., [10]), and we shall not enlarge on this.
Acknowledgments. We are grateful to Pierre Cardaliaguet for valuable
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